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Abstract:   In this paper we use a simple bureaucracy model of fiscal illusion to analyse the impact 
of intergovernmental grants on the cost efficiency of local jurisdictions. We find that a 
higher degree of redistribution within a system of fiscal equalisation or an increase in the 
amount of grants received by a local jurisdiction leads to an extension of organisational 
slack or X-inefficiency in that jurisdiction. This theoretical prediction is tested by 
conducting an empirical analysis using a broad panel of German municipalities. The 
results of the empirical analysis are consistent with the theoretical findings and therefore 
support the existence of a negative incentive effect of intergovernmental grants on local 
authorities’ cost efficiency. 
I. INTRODUCTION
A key issue in the theoretical and empirical literature of public finance is how intergovernmental 
grants influence the level of local public spending of the recipient government. Researchers 
have been particularly interested in whether grants from the federal government stimulate higher 
levels of overall spending by local governments, or rather substitute for local tax revenue. The 
first effect is called the “flypaper effect” (Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld 1979) following 
Arthur Okun’s observation that “money sticks where it hits”. This is because grants entering 
the public sector also stay there, rather than being distributed to the private sector in the form 
of lower tax payments. There is a large empirical literature trying to estimate the extent to 
which intergovernmental grants to state and local governments are associated with higher 
government spending (for a review, see e.g. Hines and Thaler 1995). Some of these studies 
attempt to explain the flypaper effect by specification errors in the econometric estimation (for 
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a recent study, see e.g. Knight 2002), other studies suggest that the individuals underly a kind 
of fiscal illusion which leads to a misperception of the “true” tax price (Courant, Gramlich 
and Rubinfeld 1979, Oates 1979).
An aspect which has attracted far less attention in the flypaper literature is concerned 
with the question whether observed changes in expenditures are associated with analogous 
changes in the actual level of public goods or services or whether increases in expenditures 
lead (at least to some extent) to a waste of resources (or X-inefficiency, Leibenstein 1966) and 
losses in productive efficiency. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, only one study has so far 
attempted to assess the impact of intergovernmental aid on technical efficiency or X-efficiency 
(Silkman and Young 1982). This empirical study investigates the technical efficiency of two 
public services (school bus transportation and public libraries) in the United States using cross 
section data. Silkman and Young (1982) show that the non-local proportion of total revenues 
(that is the proportion of intergovernmental grants) have a strong negative impact on the 
productive efficiency of local government’s services. In further studies, Athanassopoulos and 
Triantis (1998), Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007), De Borger and Kerstens (1996), and Loikkanen 
and Susiluoto (2005) analyse the general determinants of local governments’ cost efficiency 
in Greece, Spain, Belgium, and Finland – using different parametric and non-parametric 
estimation  techniques.  They  all  come  to  the  conclusion  that  (intergovernmental)  grants 
stimulate technical or cost inefficiency.1 Finally, in a recent theoretical analysis, Kotsogiannis 
and Schwager (2006) show that fiscal equalisation programmes foster the incentives of the 
incumbents towards more rent extraction by reducing the intensity of political competition.
Given this background the aim of this paper is to add to the existing literature by studying 
the causal effects of intergovernmental grants on local technical efficiency in Germany. For this 
purpose we use a simple bureaucracy model of Niskanen (1975) and introduce the possibility 
that the federal government is able to give (lump sum) grants to the local government (as a 
substitute for local tax revenues). Moreover we assume, similar to Moesen and van Cauwenberge 
(2000), that the citizens of the local jurisdiction are susceptible to a misperception of the true 
tax price of the local public goods or services due to fiscal illusion. In fact, it is assumed that 
a higher amount of intergovernmental grants leads to an underestimation of the true tax price 
by the citizens and therefore to a higher demand of public output. Using this framework we 
analyse how a higher degree of redistribution, that is an increase in the amount of grants to 
the local government, affects the technical efficiency in the provision of public goods and 
services in this local jurisdiction. We find that a higher degree of redistribution has a negative 
impact on the technical efficiency in the local jurisdiction.
Finally, the results derived in the theoretical analysis are tested in an empirical framework 
using a broad panel of German municipalities. Germany is an interesting case to study, 
since grants received from higher levels of governments make up a considerable share of 
local governments’ revenue. To figure out the impact of intergovernmental aid on technical 
1  In contrast to the above mentioned studies, Geys and Moesen (2009) find a positive relationship between grants 
and cost efficiency for a sample of Flemish municipalities. According to the authors, however, this result could 
be due to the fact that grants from higher level governments in Flanders are linked to strict supervision on 
expenditures. In addition, Worthington (2000) finds no significant relationship between grants and technical 
efficiency for a sample of Australian local governments.AlExAndEr KAlb
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efficiency we apply the stochastic frontier estimation approach proposed by Battese and Coelli 
(1995) which allows us to make use of panel data. The results of the empirical analysis are 
consistent with our theoretical findings and support the existence of a negative incentive effect 
of intergovernmental grants on local authorities’ cost efficiency. We find that an increase in 
the amount of grants received by the local government indeed leads to a reduction in technical 
efficiency or to an increase in X-inefficiency in that local jurisdiction.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we conduct the theoretical 
analysis where we also give a brief review of the original Niskanen (1971) bureaucracy model, 
and derive a testable proposition. Section 3 describes the empirical analysis including an 
introduction to the institutional setting of the German local governments. Final conclusions 
are drawn in section 4.
II. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
2.1 The Bureaucracy Model of Niskanen
In the original bureaucracy model of Niskanen (1971) the relationship between a bureau and 
its sponsor or funding agency is that of a bilateral monopoly. In our case we could assume, 
for instance, that the sponsor is represented by the local government of a municipality which 
approves a certain budget for a public bureau (e.g. the Road Construction Office) in order to 
“buy” services and goods from this bureau (e.g. the construction of new highways). We further 
assume that the electoral process in the municipality is dominated by the median voter and 
that the local government wants to meet the wishes of the median voter.
The total budget, TBN, which the sponsor is willing to approve, is assumed to be a quadratic 
function of the public output, Ǫ: 
TBN = aQ – bǪ2,  (1)
that is, the total budget is a concave function of Ǫ, reflecting diminishing marginal utility of 
public output. Moreover, the minimum total production costs for producing the public output, 
TC, are given by: 
TC = cǪ + dǪ2.  (2)
As can be seen from equation (2), total costs are assumed to rise at an increasing rate like a 
competitive firm’s cost schedule. This cost function is only known by the bureaucrat. Finally 
the bureaucrat faces the constraint that the total budget must be equal or greater than the 
minimum total costs: 
TBN ≥ TC.  (3)
Now, Niskanen (1971) assumes that the bureaucrat seeks to maximise the size of the budget, 
TBN, that is the bureaucrat maximises the budget-output function (1) over Ǫ under the constraint 
that (in)equality (3) is fulfilled. However, as pointed out by Migué and Belanger (1974), one 
implication of budget-maximisation is that the production of public output is allocatively 
inefficient (since the total budget is too large) but it is indeed technically efficient. This, in turn, ThE imPAcT of inTErgoVErnmEnTAl grAnTs on cosT EfficiEncy: ThEory And EVidEncE  
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implies that there remains no surplus revenue for the bureaucrat which can be devoted to his/
her own ends since this would compete with output. The bureaucrat, however, has preferences 
for things like income, prestige, expansion of personnel, leisure time, etc. Therefore, in a 
later version of his model, Niskanen (1975) extended the original model by assuming that the 
bureaucrat has access to the “fiscal residuum” (Orzechowski 1977; also called “discretionary 
profit”, Migué and Belanger, 1974 or “organisational slack”, Cyert and March, 1963), which 
is defined as the difference between the total budget and the minimum production costs, 
FR = TBN – TC.  (4)
The  fiscal  residuum  measures  the  degree  of  production  inefficiency  or  X-inefficiency 
(Leibenstein 1966) at each possible production level.
Under the assumption that the bureaucrat has access to the fiscal residuum both the production 
inefficiency and the output enter the utility function of the bureaucrat. That is, the bureaucrat 
(indirectly) is able to use parts of the budget for his/her own ends. One could imagine for 
instance, that the fiscal residuum or X-inefficiency generates utility for the bureaucrat in terms 
of leisure, long breaks, large expense accounts, political appointments and so on. Therefore, if 
the choice variables of the bureaucrat are public output and technical inefficiency, government 
production is allocatively as well as technically inefficient.
2.2 A Bureaucracy Model of Fiscal Illusion
Following Niskanen (1975) we assume that the utility function of the bureaucrat is given by: 
U = α1Yβ1Nγ1,  (5)
where Y represents the present value of the bureaucrat’s monetary income and N the set of 
nonmonetary perquisites of his/her position like leisure time, expensive lunches, reputation, 
and so on. Moreover, Y and N are related to the public output and the fiscal residuum (or 
maximum level of production inefficiency) as follows: 
Y = α2Qβ2FRγ2  (6)
N = α3Qβ3FRγ3.  (7)
Equations (6) and (7) can be interpreted as the reward structure of the bureaucrat which is 
established by the sponsor. The main difference between the reward structure of a manager 
in a profit-seeking firm and a typical bureaucrat is that γ2 is relatively high for the manager 
and relatively low for the bureaucrat. In contrast to the manager, the bureaucrat is not able 
to appropriate directly any of the fiscal residuum as personal income. On the other hand, the 
bureaucrat is characterized by relatively high values of β2, β3 and γ3.
Substituting Y and N in (5) yields an expression of the utility function in terms of the public 
output, Ǫ, and the fiscal residuum, FR: 






   
β = β1β2 + γ1β3   
γ = β1γ2 + γ1γ3.   
Now, the available combinations of public output and technical inefficiency determine the 
choice constraint of the bureaucrat.
In a next step, we want to derive the demand function of the voter. As pointed out by 
Niskanen (1975) the budget function (1) is the integral of the demand function facing the 
bureaucrat over the whole range of output, or in other words the monetary reflection of the 
voter’s preferences. Since Niskanen assumes a quadratic budget function the demand function 
for public output has to be linear (in prices). In order to derive this demand function we first 
assume that the utility of the voter is given by: 
U




, with ρ,θ >0,  (9)
where X is the amount of the private good, which has by assumption a price of unity, and ρ 
and θ are some parameters. Furthermore the budget constraint of the voter is given by: 
YV = Y + τg = X + τ(g)PQ,  (10)
where YV denotes the voter’s total income, Y the voter’s private income, and P the production 
price of the public output presented to the voter in the form of tax payments. Moreover, 
besides tax revenue from service recipients, the sponsor (or local government) receive lump-
sum grants, g, from higher levels of government or other local governments (due to limited 
autonomy in raising own revenues) in order to finance parts of the public output. In addition, 
the tax share, τ, accruing to the voter is assumed to depend on the amount of grants received 
by the local government. Similar to Moesen and Van Cauwenberge (2000), we assume that 
the tax share the voter will take into account in his/her consumption decision is a negative 
function of the amount of grants due to fiscal illusion (∂τ
∂g <0), that is, the higher the grants 
received by the local government, the lower the perceived tax price of the public output (by 
the voter). Therefore, the function τ(g) captures the voter’s degree of fiscal illusion.2 If the 
local government does not receive any grants, τ(g) is equal to the real tax share τ. If, on the 
other hand, the local government does receive a positive amount of grants, then τ(g) falls 
until it reaches a lower bound τ depending on the amount of grants received. Of course, if the 
voter is completely free of fiscal illusion, τ(g) equals the real tax share, τ. But for the rest of 
the paper we will assume that the voter underlies at least a certain degree of fiscal illusion. As 
can be seen from equation (10), an increase in g then has two effects on the budget constraint: 
on the one hand voter’s total income, YV, will increase since τg rises (usual income effect), 
2  The difference between this analysis and the study of Moesen and Van Cauwenberge (2000) is that the latter 
introduces the fiscal illusion in a different context. More specifically, the authors investigate how governmental 
borrowing affects the demand for public goods and services when the taxpayers are not confronted with the 
“true” costs of providing the public goods and services due to a certain degree of myopia.ThE imPAcT of inTErgoVErnmEnTAl grAnTs on cosT EfficiEncy: ThEory And EVidEncE  
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but on the other hand there will also be a reduction in the tax price of the public output due 
to fiscal illusion (price effect).
Given the utility function and the budget constraint of the (median) voter, we can easily 
derive the demand function for the public output: 
Q = ρ – θτ g P,w ith ρ,θ >0,  (11)
which, because of the quasilinearity of the utility function (9) does not depend on the voter’s 
wealth. Now, as can be seen from equation (11), an increase in the amount of grants leads to 
an increase in the demand for public output (∂Q
∂g >0) since the perceived tax price for the voter 
decreases due to fiscal illusion.3
In order to investigate the effects of an increase in grants on technical inefficiency, we 
first have to derive the budget function, TB: 







where we have used the fact that the total budget is given by P times Q. To be in line with 
the original Niskanen (1971) model, we replaced 
ρ
θ by a, 1
θ by b and (aQ – bQ2) by TBN, the 
budget function (1) where fiscal illusion is absent, that is TBN represents the “true” monetary 
reflection of the sponsor’s preferences. Since τ(g) ranges between the real tax share (τ) 
and a lower bound (τ), TB is either equal or bigger than the “true” budget, TBN. Moreover, 
substituting the total budget, TB, and the minimum total costs from equation (2), TC, in (4), 
yields an expression for the fiscal residuum: 
FR = TB – TC = a
τ g














which yields an expression of the utility function depending solely on public output. Finally, 
maximising (14) with respect to Q then leads to the level of output that maximises the utility 











If we differentiate Q* with respect to the amount of grants received by higher levels of 
government, g, we can see that g is an increasing function in Q*: 
3  For the sake of simplicity we assume that the (median) voter has quasi-linear preferences which means that 
income effects do not matter. The results, however, do not change if we use an utility function which does 
not exclude income effects. The difference between an equivalent increase in voter’s private income, then, 
would be that the latter only causes an income effect, while in our case higher grants additionally lower the 
price of public output and therefore also produce a substitution (or price) effect.AlExAndEr KAlb
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∂Q*




b + τ g d 2
∂τ
∂g > 0.  (16)
In other words, if fiscal illusion is present, the demand for public output will rise as long as the 
amount of grants increase. This is due to the fact that the voter systematically underestimates 
the true tax price of public output (∂τ
∂g< 0) and therefore substitutes private for public good 
consumption.
To find out the desired effect of an increase in g on the fiscal residuum or technical 
inefficiency we finally have to plug in the level of output that maximizes the utility of the 
bureaucrat, Q* in the definition of the fiscal residuum (13) and differentiate this expression 
with respect to g: 
∂FR*











a –2 bQ* – c +2 dQ*   17










where the asterisks denote the values that maximise the bureaucrat’s utility. The sign of the 
partial derivative of technical inefficiency with respect to the amount of grants now depends 
on the signs of the two summands in equation (17). First, if the budget is positive (that is, 
if  Q ranges between zero and a
b) and if we assume the presence of fiscal illusion (∂τ
∂g < 0) the 
sign of the first summand is positive. Concerning the second summand, we have shown in 
equation (16) that grants are an increasing function of Q*, that is the first term of the second 
summand is bigger than zero. If a marginal increase in Q* causes total budget to increase more 
than total costs (∂TB*
∂Q* > ∂TC*
∂Q* ), the second summand in equation (17) will be positive, too. If, 
on the other hand, both effects are of equal size (∂TB*
∂Q* = ∂TC*
∂Q* ), this term will be zero. The 
last two statements simply say that the increase in the fiscal residuum (due to the increase of 
grants) must lie within the budget constraint (3). Nevertheless, in both cases the overall effect 
of a marginal change in grants on technical inefficiency would be positive, which proves our 
intended point that there is a negative incentive effect of intergovernmental grants on technical 
efficiency. We can summarise these findings by the following proposition: 
Proposition: In the presence of fiscal illusion (∂τ
∂g< 0), an increase in grants from higher levels 
of government or other local governments leads to an increase in the technical inefficiency of 
the recipient government, if: (i) the budget is positive (0 < Q < a
b) and (ii) a marginal increase 
in output causes the total budget to increase more or as much as total costs (∂TB*
∂Q*  ≥ ∂TC*
∂Q* ). 
Similar to Moesen and Van Cauwenberge (2000), the above-mentioned mechanism can be 
illustrated as presented in Figure 1. The upper panel of Figure 1 shows the budget function, 
TB, and the minimum cost function for producing the public output, TC, whereas the lower 
panel outlines the corresponding fiscal residuum, FR, as well as the bureaucrat’s utility 
maximising combination of output and technical inefficiency represented by the tangency 
point of his/her indifference curve, IC, and the fiscal residuum (point a). Now, an increase in 
the amount of grants received by the local government causes the voter to assume that there ThE imPAcT of inTErgoVErnmEnTAl grAnTs on cosT EfficiEncy: ThEory And EVidEncE  
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has been a reduction in his/her tax price due to fiscal illusion. As a consequence, the voter 
demands a higher amount of public output, and the local government (which wants to meet the 
wishes of the median voter) approves a higher budget, which is shown in the upper panel by 
the upward shift of the budget curve from TB to TB´. The higher budget, in turn, leads to an 
upward shift of the fiscal residuum from FR to FR´ (lower panel of Figure 1), and, finally to 
the new tangency point a´ at which both output and technical inefficiency has risen. In other 
Figure 1: Effects of an increase in the amount of grants
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words, the bureaucrat uses parts of the new budget for the increase in public output, but he/
she also diverts parts for his/her own ends.4 
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The proposition derived above provides a testable relationship between the amount of grants 
received by the municipalities and the degree of technical inefficiency (or X-inefficiency). 
In the German case this is of particular interest, since grants received from higher levels of 
government or other local governments constitute a considerable share of local government 
revenues (as will be seen in the following subsection).
However, before presenting the results along with the underlying estimation approach and 
data set, the institutional setting of the German local governments as well as the main features 
of the German municipal system of fiscal equalisation will be provided. This is necessary in 
order to clarify the context of local public decision-making in Germany.
3.1 Institutional Background
Germany’s fiscal constitution is characterised by a differentiated federal structure, where 
municipalities constitute the lowest level of government. Nevertheless, local governments 
exhibit considerable autonomy with regard to their revenue as well as expenditure side. With 
respect to revenues, local governments have three main income sources: tax revenue (41% 
of total revenue in 2004), grants (from fiscal equalisation schemes; 31% of total revenue 
in 2004) and revenue from user charges (9% of total revenue in 2004). In the German 
state Baden-Württemberg, which will be considered here, local governments can decide 
independently on five different types of taxes: trade tax (Gewerbesteuer), property tax 
(Grundsteuer) and three bagatelle taxes which are not raised by all municipalities. As can 
be seen from Table 1, only the trade tax yields significant revenues (41.33%); in contrast, 
the revenue from the property tax accounted for only 15.04% of total tax revenue in 2004. 
Apart from these own tax revenues, municipalities also receive tax revenue from higher levels 
of government (“tax sharing”). On the one hand, they get a share of the revenue accruing 
from the federal income tax (15% of revenue raised in the state Baden-Württemberg) and 
interest income tax (12% raised in the state Baden-Württemberg), on the other hand, they 
also obtain 2.2% of the value added tax revenue raised in Germany as a whole.5 While the 
4  An alternative explanation of the inefficiency enhancing effect of intergovernmental grants could be pork 
barrel politics. According to Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981), the larger the number of special interest 
groups as well as their appointed representatives (in a representative legislature), the smaller the degree to 
which they internalise the cost of public spending. In this context, intergovernmental grants can reduce the 
degree to which an individual taxpayer and its representative internalise the costs of their policy decisions (for 
special programmes), since both benefit from specific programmes and the cost of these special programmes 
are distributed over all taxpayers. Therefore, both perceive only a fraction of the initiated costs which, in turn, 
can lead to increasing public expenditures as well as inefficiency levels. We are grateful to an anonymous 
referee for pointing this out.
5  Note that the participation of the municipalities in the value added tax revenue was introduced in 1998 when 
the trade tax on capital (Gewerbekapitalsteuer) (in the western German states) was abolished (see Ministry 
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share of the income tax accounted for 38.25% of total tax revenue in 2004, the share of the 
value added tax made up only 4.51%.
Table 1: Composition of the Tax Revenue of Baden-Württemberg’s Local 
Governments in 2004
Type of tax  Mrd. € per capita  % of total tax revenue 
Trade tax   3.59  335.54  41.33 
Property tax   1.31  122.14  15.04 
Share of income tax   3.32  310.52  38.25 
Share of value added tax   0.39  36.58  4.51 
Other taxes   0.08  7.11  0.88 
        Source: Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg, own calculations 
With respect to the allocation of funds, the German municipal system of fiscal equalisation 
incorporates both vertical and horizontal elements, whereas all transfers within this equalisation 
system are regulated by law (Finanzausgleichsgesetz – FAG). The vertical equalisation is 
concerned with the financial relationships between the state (of Baden-Württemberg) and its 
municipalities. The state has to ensure that the communities are able to perform their tasks. 
In contrast, the horizontal equalisation serves to balance differences in the financial power 
among the municipalities. This is necessary since (own) tax revenues of the communities can 
vary substantially among each other. 6
6  For more details see Ministry of Finance of Baden-Württemberg (2006). For more details on the municipal 
fiscal equalisation schemes of other German states or other countries, see e.g. Broer (2001) or Shah (2006). 
Table 2: Intergovernmental grants of Baden-Württemberg’s municipalities in 2004 
Type of grant           Mio. €             Per capita
Key grants  2110.04  197.47 
Grants for current expenditures  1372.82  128.48 
Grants for investments and 
investment assistance 
649.14  60.75 
Grants for municipalities with special 
financial requirements 
1.09  0.10 
Other general grants  454.19  42.15 
Sum  4587.28  429.31 
Source: Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg, own calculations 
The most important element of the fiscal equalisation system, however, constitutes the 
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state and the municipalities.7 Within a formula based system this fiscal equalisation mass is 
distributed to the local governments whereas jurisdictions with lower fiscal capacity receive 
more grants from the fiscal equalisation mass. The different types of grants received by the 
local governments of the state Baden-Württemberg in the fiscal year 2004 are shown in Table 2. 
As can be seen from this Table, roughly 50% of the fiscal equalisation mass are distributed 
via so-called key grants (Schlüsselzuweisungen), which are lump-sum transfers established 
according to a predetermined formula (“key”).
As mentioned above the tax revenue of the local governments strongly depends on 
the municipalities’ fiscal capacity. Therefore, one fundamental idea of the key grants is to 
equate these differences by comparing the fiscal capacity (Finanzkraft) with the fiscal needs 
(Finanzbedarf) of the municipalities. Thereby, fiscal capacity is calculated by the municipalities’ 
sum of the different tax revenues and parts of the grants received two years ago. Note that the 
calculation of the fiscal capacity in case of the trade and property tax is based on a standardised 
rather than the real tax revenue.8 Moreover, only 80% of the revenue accruing from the value 
added tax is used for the calculation of the municipalities’ fiscal capacity. The fiscal needs of 
the municipalities are, in contrast, established by the product of a predetermined per capita 
sum (Kopfbetrag) and the number of inhabitants (of each municipality). The per capita sum, 
in turn, depends on the number of the municipality’s inhabitants, since a rising number of 
inhabitants is assumed to increase fiscal needs above average. This is due to the fact that 
larger municipalities are assumed to perform more tasks and to provide qualitatively higher 
public goods and services (see Ministry of Finance of Baden-Württemberg 2006, p. 35). 
More specifically, the per capita sum is calculated by multiplying a certain (base) amount 
(Grundkopfbetrag), which is determined annually by the ministry of finance (based on certain 
criteria), with a multiplier increasing with the number of inhabitants.9
On the basis of this comparison, the system of fiscal equalisation distinguishes three types 
of municipalities: Firstly, if fiscal capacity exceeds fiscal needs, the jurisdiction is said to be 
abundant and obtains no (key) grants. In case fiscal capacity lies between 60% and 100% of 
fiscal needs, the municipality is called financially weak, and, finally, municipalities with a fiscal 
capacity of less than 60% of fiscal needs are said to be financially very weak. Of course the 
(key) grants are highest for the last category.10 The distribution of the municipalities’ financial 
7  In most of the other German states (exceptions: Lower Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate and Schleswig-Holstein), 
the fiscal equalisation mass is financed only by the states (see e.g. Lenk 2003). In Baden-Württemberg, however, 
the fiscal equalisation mass is additionally supplied by payments of the municipalities (Finanzausgleichsumlage). 
Therefore, and in contrast to the other states, the fiscal equalisation scheme in Baden-Württemberg contains - 
apart from the vertical component - a pure horizontal component whereas the equalisation schemes of (most 
of) the other states are based on a pure vertical system with a horizontal effect (for more details, see e.g. Birke 
2000). 
8  The respective standardised collection rates (Anrechnungshebesätze) amount to 290% in case of the trade tax, 
and 195% as well as 185% in case of the two types of the property tax in Baden-Württemberg.
9  For more details on the calculation of the per capita sum, see Appendix B. Note that the usage of this multiplier 
implies that larger municipalities receive compared to smaller ones higher amounts of grants. In terms of the 
proposition derived in subsection 2.2, this implies that the degree of fiscal illusion caused by intergovernmental 
grants should be higher in larger municipalities.
10  Note that the deficit in terms of the ratio fiscal capacity/fiscal needs for financially (very) weak municipalities 
is fully compensated for up to a ratio of 60%; deficits lying between 60% and 100% are balanced out only 
up to a predetermined quota (currently approximately 70% of the difference between the fiscal needs and the 
fiscal capacity).ThE imPAcT of inTErgoVErnmEnTAl grAnTs on cosT EfficiEncy: ThEory And EVidEncE  
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power in 2004 is depicted in Table 3. There it is shown, that most municipalities fall under 
the category financially weak whereas only a small fraction of the communities is abundant.
Table 3: Baden-Württemberg’s Municipalities According to their 
Financial Power in 2004
Type of municipality  Number  % of all municipalities
Abundant  104  9.36 
Financially weak  737  66.34 
Financially very weak  270  24.30 
Total 1111
Source: Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg, own calculations 
Turning to the expenditure side, the revenue obtained by local governments basically 
serves to finance three types of tasks: (1) voluntary tasks (e.g. museum), (2) duties without 
instructions of higher-level governments (e.g. cleaning of public avenues), and (3) duties with 
instructions of higher-level governments (e.g. running of local police authorities).11 Table 4 
gives a detailed overview of the amount of money spent for the different types of tasks the 
local governments face as well as the corresponding share of total expenditures for the year 
2004 – using the classification of functions as given in Baden-Württemberg’s administrative 
regulation on the municipalities’ budgets (Verwaltungsvorschrift über die Gliederung und 
Gruppierung der Haushalte der Gemeinden). As can be seen from the Table, expenditures on 
general financial management like interest and amortization repayments account for the bulk of 
total expenditures (approximately one third). A major part of the budget is also spent on social 
security (like kindergartens and youth welfare services) as well as public facilities and business 
development (roughly 11%, respectively). Other posts on the budget are generally somewhat 
smaller, whereas public safety constitutes the smallest part of the budget (approximately 3% 
of total expenditures).
3.2 Estimation Approach
To measure the (relative) efficiency of the local governments it is first necessary to select an 
adequate set of input and output combinations that helps to identify the most efficient local 
government(s) in the sample. In other words, we have to determine a best practice frontier. 
In a second step, the (relative) efficiency of the other, less efficient municipalities can then be 
determined by measuring the deviations from this best practice frontier. Basically there are 
two methods of measuring decision-making units’ technical efficiency in the literature (for an 
introduction see e.g. Lovell 1993, Blank 2000): non-parametric and parametric approaches. In 
non-parametric approaches such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA, Farrell 1957, Charnes, 
Cooper and Rhodes 1978) or Free Disposable Hull (FDH, Deprins, Simar and Tulkens 1984), 
the best practice frontier envelopes the data as tightly as possible, whereas this envelopment 
is achieved by solving a sequence of linear programs, one for each decision-making unit. 
Parametric approaches, on the other hand, establish the best practice frontier on the basis of 
11  For more details see Gern (2005).AlExAndEr KAlb
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a specific functional form using econometric estimation methods. Moreover, the deviations 
from the best practice frontier derived from parametric methods can be interpreted in two 
different ways. Firstly, deterministic approaches interpret the whole deviation from the best 
practice frontier as inefficiency. In contrast to these approaches, stochastic frontier models 
(Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt 1977, Battese and Cora 1977, Meeusen and van den Broeck 
1977) decompose the deviation of the best practice frontier in an inefficiency part, on the one 
hand, and in a part arising from other stochastic influences or measurement errors, on the other 
hand. Since stochastic frontier models are more precise in the definition of the deviation from 
the best practice frontier the present analysis uses this approach for determining the technical 
efficiency of German local governments.
Furthermore, as pointed out by Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), the analysis of technical or 
productive efficiency consists of two components: The first is the estimation of a (stochastic) 
best practice frontier whereas the second component concerns the incorporation of exogenous 
or non-discretionary variables which may influence the performance of the decision making 
units (local governments). More precisely, we can distinguish two kinds of such external 
influences: “production preconditions” and determinants of technical efficiency. The former 
can be interpreted as characteristics of municipalities that might affect both its individual 
production possibilities and its level of efficiency. Examples for such production preconditions 
are the socio-economic make-up of the population or structural factors like the level of the 
unemployment rate or the population density. The determinants of efficiency, like for example, 
Table 4: Apportionment of the Total Expenditures According to the Administrative 
Regulation on the Classification of the Municipalities in 2004
Classification 
number
Scope of  
functions 
Expenditure  
(in € per capita) 
Share of total  
expenditure (in %)
0  General Administration  191.85  7.85 
1  Public Safety  75.99  3.11 
2  Schools  161.90  6.61 
3  Science, Research, 
Culture 
89.66  3.67 
4  Social Security  280.76  11.49 
5  Health, Sport, Recovery  127.28  5.20 
6  Architecture, Housing, 
Traffic 
241.45  9.89 
7  Public Facilities, Business 
Development 
277.95  11.36 
8  Commercial Companies, 
General Basic and 
Separate Assets
153.48  6.28 
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the political colour of the local government, in contrast influence only the level of technical 
efficiency but not its best practice frontier. The grants received by the local government, of 
course, fall into the second category.
Exogenous variables have been incorporated into efficiency analyses in a variety of ways 
(for an overview see Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000). In a two-step approach (e.g. Pitt and Lee 
1981, Berger and Mester 1997, Worthington 1999) the (in)efficiency scores are first determined 
by estimating a (stochastic) frontier and then these (in)efficiency scores are regressed (e.g. 
with a Tobit censored regression model) on the exogenous variables. However, as pointed out 
by Kumbhakar, Gosh and McGuckin (1991) and Reifenschneider and Stevenson (1991) there 
are serious econometric problems with this approach. First, it must be assumed that the (in)
efficiencies scores obtained in the first stage are independently and identically distributed, but 
if this is the case, the assumption that the (in)efficiency scores exhibit a functional relationship 
with the exogenous variables in the second stage is contradicted. Second, it must further be 
assumed that the output (or input) variables used for estimating the best practice frontier in 
the first stage are uncorrelated with the exogenous variables. In case they are correlated, the 
adequate maximum likelihood estimators are biased. If a large set of output (or input) as well 
as exogenous variables is used this assumption is very likely to be violated.
To avoid (at least one of) theses inconsistencies Kumbhakar et al. (1991), Reifenschneider 
and Stevenson (1991) and Huang and Liu (1994) developed models for the technical inefficiency 
effects involved in stochastic frontier functions. In such one-step approaches the parameters 
of the stochastic frontier as well as the parameters of the exogenous variables are estimated 
simultaneously. The model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995) which will be used here 
extended  these  approaches  to  accommodate  panel  data.  Employing  a  translogarithmic 
specification (Christensen, Jorgenson and Lawrence 1973) the basic estimation equation 
used in the present analysis to identify (among other things) the impact of grants on German 
municipalities’ technical or cost efficiency12 is: 
lnCi,t = β0 + Σ
r =1
S







 βr,qlnyr,i,tlnyq,i,t + ψt +  (18)
ui,t = δ0 + Σ
j =1
J
 δjzj,i,t + ψt + wi,t,  (19)
where i is the subscript for the decision-making units and t the time subscript. S and J 
designates the number of output and exogenous variables included in the model, respectively. 
Furthermore, the dependent variable of equation (18), C, denotes the input indicator, whereas  y 
represents the various output indicators. The composed error term of equation (18), ε, consists 
of a symmetric component, v, which is usually assumed to be independently and identically 
normally distributed N(0, σ v
2), and a one-sided non-negative component, u ≥ 0, representing 
vi,t + ui,t
}= εi,t
12  Here, the terms “technical” and “cost” efficiency are used synonymously. In fact, the usage of the right term 
depends on the interpretation of equation (18). If, on the one hand, equation (18) is regarded as a cost function 
(with input prices being equal to all municipalities) the term cost efficiency would be appropriate. But if, 
on the other hand, the left hand side of equation (18) is interpreted as an aggregate input indicator (of the 
municipalties), the term technical efficiency would be more suitable. The difference between the two concepts 
is, that the cost efficiency contains besides the “technical” component additionally an “allocative” component.AlExAndEr KAlb
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inefficiency. Both error terms are assumed to be independent. Moreover, the u’s are assumed 
to be independently distributed, such that u is obtained by truncation (at zero) of the normal 
distribution N(Σ j =1
J δ jzj,i,t, σ u
2). z represents the various exogenous variables and w a random 
variable which is defined by the truncation of the normal distribution with zero mean and 
variance σ w
2 (see Batesse and Coelli 1995). The latter assumption ensures that the inefficiency 
component, u, can only take on values bigger than or equal to zero. Finally, the time trends   
are included to control for both technical change (in the stochastic frontier) and time-varying 
inefficiency effects (see also Battese and Coelli 1995, Audibert 1997).13 
3.3 Data
The empirical analysis is based on an annual database of 1111 municipalities in the German state 
of Baden-Württemberg for the period of 1990 to 2004. For the estimation, however, we restrict 
our attention to municipalities with more than 10000 inhabitants to get a more homogeneous 
setting with regard to the different types of tasks performed by the municipalities. Especially 
the provision of public goods which are carried out on a voluntary basis (e.g. libraries, public 
swimming pools, etc.) is more common in larger municipalities. The descriptive statistics 
of the input variable as well as the various output and exogenous variables for the reduced 
sample are provided in Table 5.
Similar to Geys, Heinemann and Kalb (2007) the input for providing the public services 
is approximated by total current (net) primary expenditures of the single local governments. 
These include all spending on the current budget less the difference between debt service and 
income from interest. Spending on the capital budget is not considered, since large investments 
(e.g. in infrastructure projects) are infrequent events which inflate total spending in the year 
they emerge. The empirical analysis uses net primary expenditures per capita as dependent 
variables. As can be seen from Table 5, both absolute and per capita expenditures show 
substantial variation within the state (of Baden-Württemberg).
Furthermore, the output of the local governments is approximated by five variables: (1) the 
number of students in public schools (Grund- und Hauptschulen), (2) the total population, (3) 
the share of population older than 65, (4) the number of employees covered by social security 
(at place of work), and (5) the surface of public recovery areas. All these variables represent 
approximations of important responsibilities of the municipalities with regard to educational, 
infrastructural, social, economic and recreational services. In terms of the categories listed 
in Table 4 of subsection 3.1, the first variable relates to the “Schools” function of the local 
governments, variable (2) to “General Administration” and “Architecture, Housing, Traffic”, 
variable (3) to “Social Security”, variable (4) to “Business Development”, and variable (5) to 
“Health, Sport, Recovery” and “Public Facilities”. Note, however, that these measures should 
be considered as rather crude proxies for the level of public goods provision (see also De Borger 
13  Note that we do not include municipality fixed-effects into the estimation system. This is due to the fact that 
(1) time series variation in some of the explanatory variables is very limited, so that the fixed effects estimates 
will be imprecise, and (2) the fixed effects estimator for stochastic frontier models recently developed by 
Greene (2005) (“true fixed effects estimator”, p. 277) would not allow us to assess the effects of the explanatory 
variables in the way explained above. However, as mentioned above, a two-step procedure (with efficiency 
scores obtained by the true fixed effects estimator in the first stage) leads to biased inferences.ThE imPAcT of inTErgoVErnmEnTAl grAnTs on cosT EfficiEncy: ThEory And EVidEncE  
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and Kerstens 1996, Geys 2006). Table 5 shows that the variation of the output indicators is 
very high among the communities indicating that there are substantial differences with regard 
to the (population) size of the municipalities.
As exogenous fiscal variables we first include the per capita values of the sum of all types 
of grants listed in Table 2 to the model. According to the proposition derived in section 2.2, 
we expect a negative relationship between the grants per capita and the technical efficiency 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. Min.  Max. 
 
Input variable: 
Net current primary 
expenditures (in € per capita) 
 1660.09   486.79   956.38   9644.19 
 
Output variables: 
Students in public schools   1691.08   2293.22   417   27625 
Total population   28483.86   49050.06   8203   598470 
Share of population older 
than 65 
 15.618   2.394   8.611   27.800 
Social insured employees (at 
place of work) 
 12338.65   28713.05   663   385197 
Recovery area (in are)   6115.54   10242.25   376   110841 
 
Fiscal control variables: 
Grants (in € per capita)   354.59   132.71   33.48   1898.35 
Abundant municipalities   0.084   0.277   0   1 
Financially weak 
municipalities 
 0.712   0.453   0   1 
Financially very weak 
municipalities 
 0.204   0.403   0   1 
 
Other control variables: 
Unemployment rate (in %)   6.216   1.807   1.775   13.3 
Population density 
(inhabitants per hectare) 
 5.718   4.563   0.682   28.86 
Students at university   870.40   4160.85   0   35152 
Accommodation facilities   12.883   18.028   0   155 
Herfindahl index   0.339   0.069   0.211   1 
Share of left   29.318   10.478   0   55.556 
Year   8   4.321   1   15 
Sample size: 3675 observations; 245 municipalities over 15 years (1990-2004). AlExAndEr KAlb
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of the local governments. In this context the question arises whether there could be a problem 
of endogeneity when trying to identify the effects of grants received by the local governments 
on cost efficiency. With regard to this question it can be argued that the amount of grants 
received by the municipalities mainly depend on the fiscal capacity, that is on the sum of the 
different tax revenues of the local governments. Hence, there is no direct relationship between 
(cost) efficiency and the amount of grants received, since higher inefficiencies primarily lead 
to increases in expenditures.14 
Moreover, to control for the financial power of a community which serves as a basis in 
the municipal fiscal equalisation system (see section 3.1), dummy variables for abundant and 
financially weak municipalities were created and incorporated into the estimation equation 
(19). Since abundant municipalities exhibit the highest fiscal capacity (fiscal capacity > fiscal 
needs), it is expected that these municipalities have – in comparison to the other two types of 
municipalties – more money to spend and therefore can afford more or qualitatively higher 
public goods and services.
In addition, as mentioned in section 3.2, it is very important to control for other characteristics 
of the municipalities which might influence their individual production possibilities as well 
as their level of inefficiency. First, population density is included because it approximates 
the rural and urban divide among the different municipalities. Moreover, it can be regarded 
as a proxy for the heterogeneity of property prices which tend to differ substantially between 
rural and urban communities. While a high population density points to cost advantages due 
to regional concentration of services (see e.g. De Borger and Kerstens 1996), higher property 
prices in urban areas may render production more costly. Therefore the effect of the population 
density on the level of municipalities’ spending is ambiguous. Second, as pointed out by Geys, 
Heinemann and Kalb (2007), the level of the local authorities’ unemployment rate may also 
affect the costs of providing a given bundle of public services in opposed directions. On the 
one hand, a higher unemployment rate implies higher spending on unemployment and housing 
benefits (“cost effect”) and, on the other hand, a higher unemployment rate can also entail 
lower demand for high quality public services (and therefore lower spending), since people 
living in communities with high unemployment rates typically have less money to spend 
(“preference effect”).
Third, it is hypothesised that municipalities which are more dependent on tourism (e.g. the 
black forest, the region around Lake Constance) have to spend relatively more money on public 
services, since tourists typically have a greater demand for high-cost or high-quality services like 
adventure pools, an excellent net of hiking trails, and so on. Therefore, the variable accommodation 
facilities, which captures the municipalities’ number of guesthouses (hotels, boarding houses, 
youth hostels, etc.) was added to the specification. Fourth, the number of students enrolled at 
universities (of the university cities) were incorporated to the estimation equation (19). Similar 
14  Of course, there can be doubts whether the variable intergovernmental grants is really exogenous in this context. 
For example, it could be argued that there are incentives for the local governments to lure additional grants in 
order to reduce the pressure to increase efficiency generated by additional expenditures which otherwise have 
to be financed by own tax revenues. In this case, reverse causality would be an issue and instrumental variable 
(IV) estimation should be considered. However, the Battese and Coelli (1995) model does not allow for the 
introduction of instrumental variables. Since the “traditional” two-step approaches lead to biased inferences 
(see subsection 3.2), the one-step approach used here is, in our opinion, nonetheless preferable.ThE imPAcT of inTErgoVErnmEnTAl grAnTs on cosT EfficiEncy: ThEory And EVidEncE  
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to municipalities which are more dependent on tourism, it is hypothesised that university cities 
have to spend relatively more money for infrastructure services like, for example, a bus line 
network, student hostels or administrative things being associated with students.
Moreover, political control variables were included in the specification. The Herfindahl 
index measures the political concentration or monopolisation of the local council. It is calculated 
out of the important parties’ share of seats (from “right” to “left”: CDU, FDP, SPD, GRÜNE) 
and the share of seats of the so called “free voter unions”15. It is expected that high political 
concentration points to low political competition and thus should reduce efficiency (see e.g. 
Besley, Persson and Sturm 2005). As a measure of political preferences, the share of seats of 
left-wing parties (i.e. SPD and GRÜNE) in the local council (share of left) was incorporated to 
estimation equation (19). This variable measures the impact of ideology on technical efficiency. 
The ideological effect, however, is not easy to determine a priori (Geys, Heinemann and 
Kalb 2010), since left-wing parties indeed are often assumed to have preferences for a larger 
government size. However, a larger government size not necessarily implies less efficient 
governments. Therefore the effect of the share of left-wing parties in the local council on 
technical efficiency is ambiguous.16
Finally, to control for time effects in the stochastic frontier as well as in the inefficiency 
model a time trend (year) was included in equation (18) and (19).
3.4 Results
The results of the estimation are shown in Table 6.17 As can be seen from this table we 
estimated two types of cost functions, a translogarithmic cost function as introduced in section 
3.2 and a simple Cobb-Douglas cost function to check for the robustness of the results.
First of all, note that the variance parameter γ is close to one in both specifications 
and highly significant. This parameter (lying between 0 and 1) indicates how much of the 
variation in the composed error term is due to the inefficiency term, ui,t, in equation (18). A 
value close to zero indicates that the vast majority of residual variation is due to the normal 
disturbance error, vi,t, whereas a value close to one indicates that much of the variation is 
explained by the inefficiency component, ui,t. Therefore, in our case, much of the variation 
in the composed error term is due to the inefficiency term, ui,t. Moreover, we carried out 
(generalised) likelihood ratio tests. Firstly, we tested the null hypothesis that all covariates of 
the inefficiency model (19) are jointly equal to zero. This resulted in a test statistic of about 
1167 in the translogarithmic and 1328 in the Cobb-Douglas case indicating that in both cases 
the null hypothesis can strongly be rejected. Secondly, a test of the Cobb-Douglas (restricted 
model) against the translogarithmic (unrestricted model) cost function yielded a test statistic 
15  Free voter unions are loose federations of persons not belonging to special parties. In Germany such federations 
only exist on the local level. One recent exception is the German state Bavaria, where the free voter unions 
entered the state parliament in 2008.
16  Note that information about the party affiliation of the mayor which is also member of the local council, was 
not available. Though the mayor has agenda-setting power, she/he is only a usual member of the local council 
with a simple vote. Therefore, the missing party affiliation of the mayor distorts the results of the two political 
variables only marginally (at least in municipalities with a relatively large council).
17  For space constraints only the coefficients of the inefficiency model (19) are shown. The coefficients of the 
full model, however, are reported in Table A1 of the Appendix.AlExAndEr KAlb
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of about 210 which means that we can reject the null hypothesis of the restricted model at the 
one percent level. This indicates that the non-linearities captured by the translogarithmic cost 
function (quadratic and cross-product terms of the output measures) are highly significant 
and that the translogarithmic function represents the cost structure of the municipalities better 
than the Cobb-Douglas function. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the Cobb-Douglas cost 
function can serve to check the robustness of the results.
Table 6: Determinants of Baden-Württemberg Local Governments’ Cost Efficiency
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Log-likelihood  2279.94  2174.78 
Note: N = 3675. Dependent variable: net current primary expenditures per capita. t-values are given in parentheses. 
** (*) denotes significance at 5% (10%) level. Coefficients of the output indicators (and their quadratic and cross 
product terms) as well as the constant terms of the frontier and the inefficiency model are not reported (see Table 
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The results in Table 6 support the negative incentive effect of intergovernmental grants 
on local authorities’ cost efficiency as stated in the proposition of section 2.2. The coefficient 
of the variable “grants” is in the translogarithmic as well as in the Cobb-Douglas case highly 
significant and has the expected positive sign indicating that an increase in the amount of 
grants received by the local government leads (through an increase of the expenditures) to 
a rise in technical inefficiency. As can be seen from the Table, however, the effect is with a 
coefficient of 0.0014 both in the translogarithimic and in the Cobb-Douglas case very small. 
Table 6 also shows that the dummy variables for abundant and financially weak municipalities 
are both positive and highly statistically significant. This supports our hypothesis of section 
3.3 where we argued that abundant or financially weak municipalities have (in relation to 
financially very weak communities, respectively) more money to spend which, in turn, enable 
these municipalities to afford more or qualitatively higher public goods and services.
Concerning the other control variables a closer look at Table 6 reveals that the unemployment 
rate has a negative sign with robust significance in both the translogarithmic and the Cobb-
Douglas case. Hence, the preference effect mentioned in section 3.3 seems to outweigh 
the cost effect. Secondly, population density significantly decreases costs suggesting that 
densely populated communities have cost advantages due to agglomeration economies. 
Moreover, the variable “students at university” has, contrary to our prediction in section 3.3, 
a negative sign in the translogarithmic case. In the Cobb-Douglas case, however, the sign is 
positive. Hence, the effect of this variable on the best practice frontier is ambigious. Finally, 
the variable “accommodation facilities” is in both cases positive and highly statistically 
significant. This is in accordance with our statement in section 3.3 where we hypothesised 
that touristic regions have (relatively) higher expenditures due to greater demand for high-
cost or high-quality services.
The political variables included in the estimation equation also attain statistical significance. 
As expected, the Herfindahl index, as an indicator for political concentration and monopolisation, 
significantly reduces efficiency in both specifications, or in other words, low political competition 
in the local governments seems to increase inefficiency. Moreover, local governments with a 
high share of left-wing parties seem to be involved with higher inefficiency.
Finally, the time trend included in the inefficiency model (“year2”) is positive and highly 
significant, too. This indicates that cost inefficiencies in the provision of public goods and 
services tended to increase throughout the 15-year period.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates the causal effect of intergovernmental grants on local jurisdictions’ 
cost efficiency or X-efficiency. For this purpose we use the simple bureaucracy model of 
Niskanen (1975) and introduce the possibility that the federal government is able to give 
grants to the local jurisdictions in order to substitute for (missing) local tax revenues due to 
limited autonomy in raising own revenues. Similar to Moesen and van Cauwenberge (2000) we 
assume that the voter underlies a kind of illusion with respect to the true tax price of the public 
goods and services provided by the local government. In fact, we assume that the existence 
of intergovernmental grants causes the voter to underestimate the true tax price of the public AlExAndEr KAlb
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goods due to fiscal illusion. Using this theoretical framework we show that a higher degree of 
redistribution or an increase in the amount of grants received by the local government leads to 
an increase in technical inefficiency in that local jurisdiction. Our empirical analysis support 
the existence of such an (positive) incentive effect of fiscal equalisation on local jurisdictions’ 
cost inefficiency. In line with the findings of Silkman and Young (1982) and De Borger and 
Kerstens (1996) we show (using a broad panel of German municipalities) that an increase in 
the amount of grants received by the local governments indeed results in an increase in the 
cost (or technical) inefficiency in that local jurisdiction.
With regard to efficiency considerations, one implication of the above derived result 
is that, in order to reduce the degree of inefficiency (or to eliminate the fiscal illusion), the 
federal government should give more autonomy to the local jurisdictions in raising their own 
revenue, since, in this case, the fiscal illusion stemming from the intergovernmental grants 
would diminish. In this context it would be interesting to analyse whether non-matching 
grants stimulate technical inefficiency or X-inefficiency more than matching grants, since 
then the fiscal equalisation scheme can be organised in such a way that technical inefficiency 
will be minimised. But this is left for further research. Furthermore, the negative relationship 
between the grants and the local governments’ efficiency could be reduced by including 
explicit performance incentives (for the incumbents) in the formulas for intergovernmental 
grants (Silkman and Young 1982).
Finally, it should be noted that the empirical results have been derived by using a very limited 
and rough set of indicators representing the whole outputs (and inputs) of a municipality. Here, 
of course, a more detailed reproduction of the tasks accomplished by the municipalities would 
be desirable. Unfortunately, this has not been possible so far due to missing data (availability). 
Nevertheless, a further step could be to investigate the effect of intergovernmental grants on 
technical inefficiency for a particular area of public goods provision (e.g. waste collection, 
public libraries and so on), since in that case the definition of outputs is much easier and more 
obvious.
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Table A1: Complete results of the multi-output frontier estimation
 





























A2   0.0801 
(1.2610)
 – 
B2   0.0044 
(0.0592)
 – 
C2   -0.1026 
(-1.3724)
 – 
D2   0.0477**
(3.8634) 
 – 
E2   0.0254**
(4.6239) 
 – 
A*B   0.0096 
(0.0797)
 – 
A*C   -0.2153*
(-2.0287)  
 – 
A*D   -0.0563 
(-1.3021)
 – 
A*E   -0.1048**
(-3.4756)  
 – 
B*C   0.1958*
(1.8423)
 – 
B*D   -0.0112 
(-0.2224) 
 – 
B*E   0.0091
(0.2899)  
 – AlExAndEr KAlb
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C*D   0.0625
(1.4124) 
 – 
C*E   -0.0829** 
(-2.7055)
 – 
D*E   0.0154 
(1.3177)
 –



























































Log-likelihood   2279.94   2174.78 
Note: N = 3675. Dependent variable: net current primary expenditures per capita. The dependent and output 
variables as well as the variable students at university are in natural logs. t-values are given in parentheses. ** (*) 
denotes significance at 5% (10%) level. The variables “year1” and “year2” account for both technical change in 
the stochastic frontier and time-varying inefficiency effects. The results were obtained by using FRONTIER 4.1 
(Coelli, 1996).
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APPENDIX B: PER CAPITA SUM OF THE MUNICIPALITIES
Under art. 7, para. 2 FAG, the per capita sum (Kopfbetrag) of the municipalities is determined 
by multiplying the base amount (Grundbetrag), which is determined annually by the ministry 
of finance (of Baden-Württemberg) according to certain criteria, with the following multipliers: 
  (1) 100% for municipalities with less than 3,000 inhabitants
  (2) 110% for municipalities with 10,000 inhabitants
  (3) 117% for municipalities with 20,000 inhabitants
  (4) 125% for municipalities with 50,000 inhabitants
  (5) 135% for municipalities with 100,000 inhabitants
  (6) 155% for municipalities with 200,000 inhabitants
  (7) 179% for municipalities with 500,000 inhabitants
  (8) 186% for municipalities with more than 600,000 inhabitants.
In case the number of inhabitants is lying between two of the above mentioned figures, a 
proportionate multiplier is used. In 2004, the base amount was 690 €.